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Trump and Truth
Greg Weiner

W

hen George Wa shington convened his first cabinet meeting,
the seats around the table were occupied by the likes of Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson, the scholar-statesman from Virginia, an accomplished architect, horticulturalist, and future president of the
American Philosophical Society, whose writing credits included the
Declaration of Independence and Notes on the State of Virginia.
Next to him was the Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, author
of the bulk of the Federalist Papers, the foremost American contribution to the Western political canon. Henry Knox, learned in Latin,
Greek, and French, self-taught in military history, and a general in
the Revolution, served as secretary of war. It says something about the
heft of the group assembled that perhaps its least distinguished member was Edmund Randolph, the attorney general, a graduate of the
College of William and Mary who both introduced the Virginia Plan
that became the template for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and
served on the Committee of Detail that converted it into a first draft of
the Constitution.
Shortly after Donald Trump arrived in Washington for his inauguration, he declared to a luncheon at his Trump International Hotel that
“[w]e have by far the highest IQ of any cabinet ever assembled!” Setting
aside whether intelligence is the proper measure of political competence — might he have aspired to assemble the wisest or most prudent
cabinet in history? — it is no insult to such public servants as his secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, or Treasury chief Steve Mnuchin to say that
Trump’s statement was almost certainly false. More intelligent than a
line-up that included Jefferson and Hamilton? Smarter than Lincoln’s
Gr e g We i n e r is an assistant professor of political science at Assumption College and the
author of American Burke: The Uncommon Liberalism of Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
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“team of rivals,” in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s formulation — William
Seward, Salmon Chase, Edwin Stanton, and Edward Bates?
Trump’s claim, reflecting his propensity for the superlative form, elicited some groans and a touch of ridicule, but mostly knowing dismissals.
Of course, there are no official records, as there ought not to be, on
the intelligence quotients of cabinet members, so his statement was not
objectively falsifiable. But others — the murder rate was the highest in
decades, he saw Muslims in New Jersey celebrating 9 / 11 — have been.
Trump claimed at an inaugural ball that “even” the press had called
the crowd that assembled for his swearing-in “massive” when in fact
the coverage the entire day had emphasized the smallness of the turnout compared with the crowds for his predecessor. The next day he
announced to CIA employees that he had seen a million to a millionand-a-half people at the inauguration, which, by multiples, outstripped
all crowd estimates. The press, he now complained, had only shown
empty fields. Standing before the CIA memorial wall as a backdrop, opposite which are etched the words “ye shall know the truth,” he said the
assembled masses had extended to the Washington Monument. They
had not. There are pictures.
This manner of falsehood is trivial compared to questions of war and
peace. But all of Trump’s distortions raise a serious question: Does the
integrity of language matter in politics?
T he Fa n ta sizi ng of Poli t ics
Trump is often said to have ushered in an era of post-truth politics. This
is to give him more credit than he has earned. He is the culmination, not
the origination, of this trend, for which the hard left, and especially the
academic left, now awash in apoplexies over the president’s distortions,
can largely blame itself. If Trump is the first postmodern president, it is
because the left has spent decades championing a postmodernism that
made language an instrument of will.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan knew. Forty-one years nearly to the day
before Trump was elected to the White House, Moynihan delivered his
famed address to the United Nations decrying the General Assembly’s
resolution equating Zionism with racism. There is a symmetry, or rather
asymmetry, between the events.
Reflecting later on the address in his book A Dangerous Place,
Moynihan, a fierce liberal critic of the illiberal left in America and
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abroad, said he objected not merely to the vilification of Israel but
also to the corruption of language involved in the appropriation of
the word “racism”: “I had wanted to speak to the issue of language;
to say that to preserve the meaning of words is the first responsibility
of liberalism.”
In that task, liberalism — or, rather, leftism — failed, and that is no
small part of the reason Trumpism triumphed. Of this, the left seems astonishingly unaware. On Inauguration Day, a group of anthropologists
protested Trump with nationwide “teach-ins” featuring, with no evident
sense of irony, readings of Michel Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended.
In the lectures compiled in that book, Foucault characterizes truth
as a weapon of power:
In order to characterize not just the mechanism of the relationship between power, right, and truth itself but its intensity and
constancy, let us say that we are obliged to produce the truth by
the power that demands truth and needs it in order to function:
we are forced to tell the truth, we are constrained, we are condemned to admit the truth or to discover it. Power constantly
asks questions and questions us; it constantly investigates and records; it institutionalizes the search for the truth, professionalizes
it, and rewards it.
Foucault claims merely to be telling a story about the use of truth, but
the implications of that story naturally devalue it. He proceeds to say
that the philosopher “telling the truth, recounting the story, rediscovering memories and trying not to forget anything, well, that person
is inevitably on one side or the other: he is involved in the battle, has
adversaries, and is working toward a particular victory.”
“Discourse,” Foucault says, employing the word now pervasive in the
academy, is always “perspectival.” The moment a claimant to truth seeks
a particular and especially an empowering end, truth is no longer universal. “The truth is, in other words, a truth that can be deployed only
from its combat position, from the perspective of the sought-for victory
and ultimately, so to speak, of the survival of the speaking subject himself.” There is consequently “a basic link between relations of force and
relations of truth” in the Western tradition, and thus the association of
truth with “neutrality” is “being dissolved.”
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It is difficult to see how, on this account, truth could be grasped or
asserted in any way other than manipulation. By Foucault’s reasoning,
objective truth, if it exists, is inaccessible to real human experience.
This is misguided, for several reasons. One, unless Foucault was onto
something that Aristotle missed, is the inescapable relationality of human beings, our inherently political natures. But to say that human
beings are relational is not to say that truth is relative. Rather, Aristotle
derives man’s political essence from that which makes us unique among
creatures, which is logos, the capacity of speech attached to reason:
For, as we assert, nature does nothing in vain; and man alone
among the animals has speech [logos]. The voice indeed indicates
the painful or pleasant, and hence is present in other animals as
well; for their nature has come this far, that they have a perception of the painful and pleasant and indicate these things to each
other. But speech serves to reveal the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust.
This is inherently an interpersonal, political capacity. The isolated individual has no need for logos. He who can share nothing or needs nothing “is
either a beast or a god.” Few of these walk among us, which means that the
atomized individual is incapable of arriving at truth except in community
with others. Given that the pursuit of truth is inherently a political activity,
it is inseparable from the relationships that Foucault says distort it.
Of course, politics as an Aristotelian phenomenon is wholly different
from and nobler than Foucault’s mere imposition of power. But it is inherently associated with the notion of authority. In a complex society governed
by a division of labor, we also have no choice but to recognize the authority
of both eminent individuals and those with particular expertise.
That is not to say the individual surrenders his capacity of judgment.
One substantial exercise of judgment is deciding to which authorities one
should defer, and with respect to what and under what circumstances
to do so. The point is that not all of us share comparable expertise in all
the vast areas of life that a complex society must govern and on which
we seek to have opinions.
We cannot all expect to have comparably informed views of topics
ranging from medicine to metaphysics. Yet these are realms in which
truth, even if unattained, exists. This does not mean truth must be
82
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rendered merely technical or scientific. Nor does it mean governance is
reducible to rigid truths cast in harsh blacks and whites. The progressive aspiration to scientific legislation notwithstanding, politics is much
more often a matter of prudential judgment than scientific precision.
Aristotle recognized as much in observing that the good and bad and
just and unjust, while objective qualities, required the social capacity of
logos to be approached.
But such judgment is often rooted in facts, and, even where facts
are in dispute, judgment is conducted and conveyed in words. In his A
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,
John Adams likely (and characteristically) overstated the case in decrying Marchamont Needham’s “[p]oetry and mystics,” which is to say
oratorical flourish, as poorly suited to the study of politics. “The simplest style, the most mathematical precision of words and ideas, is best
adapted to discover truth, and to convey it to others, in reasoning on
this subject,” he asserted.
James Madison was more accurate in noting that words are an unavoidably imprecise medium, something he identified in Federalist
No. 37 as a source of difficulty in constitutional drafting: “When the
Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”
That is all the more reason to preserve words rather than merely surrender to their use as pure instruments of will.
Yet this surrender is the continuation of a trend dating at least to the
1960s left, whose “great debasement of language” and “fantasizing of
politics” Moynihan abhorred:
Upper-class lying — that the men in jail are political prisoners, that
the fatherless child is happier, that the welfare system is a conspiracy to keep the proletariat passive — is destroying standards of
discourse. The language of politics grows more corrupt. We have
graduated a demi-generation of students who appear lost to reality.
We are beginning to encounter middle-of-the-road politicians who
will seemingly say anything. We approach a fantasized condition.
As Steven Hayward has noted, it is a condition that the far left, whose
influence is spreading to mainstream liberalism, is poorly equipped
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Nat iona l Affa ir s · Spr i ng 201 7

to resist given its long project to undermine the integrity of truth
claims. The rapid diffusion and acceptance of transgender ideology,
and the stigmatization of those who question it as bigots, illustrates
the use of language as will. The bifurcation between “sex” and “gender” — the former held to be a biological reality and the latter a social
construct — is a remarkably sudden etymological innovation that has
swept through society from its source in the intellectual left in an astonishingly brief time.
The mutation of gender pronouns from terms reflecting objective,
recognizable realities in the concrete world to expressions of individual
will — with the extraordinarily individualized nature of the willing belying the claim that there is anything “social” about the construction
involved — is but one example of the effervescence of language.
Its rapid-fire acceptance among mainstream and even partisan journalists, artisans whose craft depends on the integrity of language, is
especially disturbing. A time traveler from a generation ago would read
high-minded journalistic accounts of today’s disputes over bathroom
access in vain to understand why there is any controversy over “girls” described with the feminine pronoun wishing to use women’s bathrooms
and locker rooms. Only occasionally do the stories disclose, and then
only in passing and often at the end, that the individuals involved are biologically male. Even the story on the Fox News website about President
Obama’s commutation of Chelsea Manning’s sentence for disclosing
troves of classified documents described the leaker as “she.”
Yet it is far easier to call someone “male” or “female” as a matter of
objective reality than it is to say President Trump “falsely” described his
inaugural crowds as “massive.” This is not a wholly surprising development. The press has long displayed a congenital allergy to objective
truth, though, ironically, in the name of objectivity. Now, in the era of
Trump, they are disarmed.
Ser iously or Li t er a lly
In Against All Hope, his memoir of Fidel Castro’s gulag, Armando
Valladares recounts, in excruciating detail, two decades of torture and
neglect, including having human feces sprayed into his mouth and
caked onto his skin for so long that fungi grew and had to be scraped
off with the top of a tin can. He was once marched into a lake of sewage
in which one of his fellow prisoners nearly sank and drowned. He was
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beaten with everything from chains to truncheons to bayonets. He was
fed maggot-infested remnants of rotted food.
When Castro died in late 2016, the New York Times gamely offered in
a caption on its webpage that Castro was “seen as a ruthless despot by
some and hailed as a revolutionary hero by others.” This is what passes
for objectivity. It is the idea that any claim must be held equal and stated
on equal terms with any other. There is no objective sense, however, in
which Castro was a “hero” (defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as someone “distinguished by the performance of courageous or noble
actions”) any more than there is an objective sense in which Donald
Trump saw Muslims rioting in celebration in Jersey City on the afternoon the Towers fell.
Fair enough, the Times buried the word “hero” beneath the obfuscating mists of the passive voice — “was seen as” — but it similarly qualified
what Castro most certainly was in any objective sense, provided words
have fixed meanings: both ruthless (OED: “feeling or showing no pity or
compassion”) and a despot (“an absolute ruler of a country”).
Yet what passes for fairness is telling two sides to stories that do not
have them. There is a circle at work. The press must do this for the sake of
credibility; if it had more credibility, it could simply state facts. There are
attempts to do this now, desperately, as the Trump administration chokes
off the media’s access to the White House. Reporters describe Trump’s
statements as “false,” “exaggerated,” and “misleading.” One headline in
the New York Times accused Trump of repeating a “lie.” Yet the press
had never done so with other figures before. The irony is thick: It is the
media’s discomfort with objective truth that disqualifies it from being
believed when it calls Trump on his violations of objective truth now.
Of course, that politicians fib is neither shocking nor new. Hillary
Clinton seemed as incapable of acknowledging the truth about her email
scandal as Bill Clinton, dissecting and brutalizing the meaning of “is,”
had been about his intern scandal. Trump’s practice is more insidious. It
is a steady deflation of the currency of language through serial exaggeration, gratuitous superlatives, and, yes, reflexive distortion.
How literally should Trump be taken, especially when such penchants
are well known? The journalist Salena Zito incisively said Trump’s supporters took him seriously but not literally, whereas his critics took him
literally but not seriously. There is a great deal to that, and a great deal
that it reveals.
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It is neither possible nor prudent for every word in politics, any more
than for every word in romance, to comply with the criterion of literal
truth. But something is amiss with respect to the unique role words play
in politics. When the best that can be hoped for on the international
stage is that the world will not take the president of the United States at
his word, because he systematically aggrandizes language and says things
that are not meant to be taken “literally,” serious questions arise.
Barack Obama was right when he said that the words presidents use
can start wars or move markets. That is a useful tool that ought both to
be preserved and to be sparingly employed. Yet Trump uses language
so promiscuously — he tweets with exclamation points and all capital
letters even now, as president of the United States; he pledged in his
inaugural address to “eradicate” radical Islamism “completely from the
face of the earth,” something no serious person thinks possible — that it
is likely the next chief executive will have to rebuild the linguistic credibility of the office. Indeed, one hopes that will be necessary, because the
alternative would be that the world spends Trump’s presidency taking
him both seriously and literally. One or the other will have to go.
The distinction between the literal and the serious also forces an
artificial cleavage between speech and deed. A common refrain is that
Trump’s speech is atrocious but his policies are defensible. Accepting
this premise — which entails accepting a degree of protectionism, presidentialism, and other practices that have traditionally been anathema to
conservatism — there is still the fact that policies receive their meaning,
expression, and justification through speech. If speech lacks meaning,
policies are imposed through patent will.
That is why the credibility of the office of the president is not all
that is at stake. The presidency itself is already an inflated office in the
constitutional system. Its credibility is vital, but the deeper threat is to
the integrity of language itself.
T he Cur r enc y of R epublic a nism
The 1960s left did not invent the notion of language as an instrument of
will, nor was Foucault the first to theorize it. That distinction belongs,
perhaps, to the ancient Greek sophist and rhetorician Gorgias, immortalized in the Platonic dialogue whose title bears his name. In it, his
interlocutor Socrates distinguishes between “conversation,” his method,
and “oratory.”
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Gorgias boasts about the use of language as a weapon of power that
causes others to act as one wills by inducing a sense of conviction in
them about the just and unjust. “[O]ratory,” he announces to Socrates,
“embraces and controls almost all other spheres of human activity.” Yet
even Gorgias, falling into one of Socrates’ legendary traps, claims the
power of oratory can be used well or poorly — that is, rightly or abusively. For Foucault, the presence of power is itself inherently a stigma of
misuse. The issue is what happens to political conversation when words
are no longer attached to objective meanings in the observable world.
This is why Moynihan called the defense of language “the first responsibility of liberalism” — that is, liberalism in the classical sense, the
kind of liberalism whose institutions maintain predictability and freedom, including the freedom of self-government. Words are the currency
of republicanism. They are the liberal alternative to the imposition of
pure power. And words with meaning are the alternative to the imposition of sheer will through the manipulation Gorgias described.
Foucault, in short, is wrong. Words are not a means of coercion. They
are the alternative to it.
In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, recounting the
revolution at Corcyra and the subsequent rebellions it unleashed across
the region, understood the collapse of language as a symptom of the
collapse of civil society:
So bloody was the march of the revolution, and the impression which it made was the greater as it was one of the first to
occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed. . . . Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to
take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came
to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation,
specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question, inaptness to act
on any.
The Judeo-Christian tradition for this reason sharply emphasizes the
integrity of words. In Jewish thought, the importance of speech is signaled in the first lines of Genesis when it is the mechanism God uses for
creation. Throughout Genesis, human words have the power to instigate realities, as in the case of Isaac’s blessing, which, though mistakenly
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given to Jacob rather than Esau, sticks because it has been spoken. The
Christian Gospel of John begins by paralleling Genesis: “In the beginning was the Word” — significantly, in the Greek, Logos. In Catholicism,
the Logos is the second person of the Trinity, which makes whatever has
being intelligible through words.
In politics, which is not a static affair, language does not merely reveal realities. It generates them. That is true in a double sense. One is the
use of language by public figures speaking to one another, the public,
and the world. Some deception and wordplay are, of course, naturally
involved in statecraft and negotiation. But when the leaders of countries, or of the branches of our government, or of the Republican and
Democratic caucuses, reach a bargain, they ultimately do so through the
medium of language. They may lie, of course, and their credibility and
thus effectiveness may suffer. But if the underlying language itself has
no meaning, and is broadly understood legitimately to have no meaning because it has been deflated into nothingness, the exchange is not
possible in the first place.
As Thucydides notes, this also makes the practice of public virtues
impossible. If moderation cannot be distinguished from cowardice — a
confusion Burke would later predict amid the ravages of the French
Revolution as well — it can be neither exhibited nor recognized. If recklessness is confused with courage, it is incited.
Thus the second sense in which language matters: the inhibition of
political conversation among the people themselves. We are apt to make
mistakes when our language lacks clear meaning. As George Orwell
wrote in his seminal essay “Politics and the English Language,” the subtext of which is that to control words is to control the levers of power,
“But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.”
This inability to converse is especially troubling in a polarized time.
Americans are retreating not just behind partisan lines but also into
private and disparate realities. The era of three major networks may
have warranted complaints about bias, but at least political conversation could occur within a broad consensus about facts. Dispute thus
pertained to their interpretation and implications.
Today 47% of Americans who identify as “consistently conservative”
call Fox News their main source for news about government and politics, according to a survey from the Pew Research Center. Consistently
liberal voters turn to a greater diversity of sources, but only because a
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greater diversity of sources appealing to them are available: CNN, NPR,
MSNBC, and the New York Times.
Social media accelerates the self-selection of news. According to the
same survey, 75% of consistently or mostly conservative Americans say
they see Facebook posts about politics that mostly or always align with
their views. Liberals should not mount a high horse: They are likelier,
Pew found, to hide from, block, “de-friend,” or stop following someone
because of a political post. Some 69% of mostly or consistently liberal
Americans have done so. Perhaps more disturbing, the more fixed people become in their views, Pew found, the less likely they are to speak
with those with whom they disagree.
In this environment, plausibility is the new truth. Call it the new
postmodernism. It was on display when Bill O’Reilly, author of a tract
proffering the thesis that Ronald Reagan was mentally compromised
while serving in the White House, all but came through the camera at
George Will, whose column had discredited the book. O’Reilly began
the interview by attacking Will for not calling him before criticizing his
book, then proceeded to defend himself for not talking to principals in
the Reagan administration before writing the book because they had
“skin in the game.” For “proof” that Will was “lying,” O’Reilly cited
Edmund Morris’s “biography” of Reagan, which was in fact a widely
panned fictionalized memoir.
O’Reilly raged, willing the words to mean what he wanted. Will
remained cool. Later, O’Reilly attacked Will again for having criticized Trump’s pressuring of Carrier Corporation to maintain jobs in
the United States. “Drop the personal stuff,” O’Reilly admonished Will.
“Tell the truth.” The truth was that Will had not said anything personal.
The day after Trump’s inauguration, Fox declined to renew Will’s contract. O’Reilly remains on the air.
Meanwhile, on MSNBC, host Rachel Maddow piled up no fewer
than four adverbs when she announced that then-President-elect Trump
“blatantly, and overtly, bluntly, simply lied” when he said Russian
hacking had not influenced the outcome of the election. Yet President
Obama’s White House had said the election results “accurately reflect
the will of the American people.”
She had previously said the Koch brothers had funded an effort to
require mandatory drug tests for welfare recipients in Florida. They had
not. She claimed John Kasich signed an Ohio law requiring transvaginal
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ultrasounds for women seeking abortions. The law specified the ultrasounds had to be performed externally.
Devotees of such hosts are often not concerned with the truth so
much as the plausibility of their claims. An alternative explanation for
any phenomenon — which the media is always pleased to supply in the
name of fairness, regardless of its truth — is adequate to provide cover
for one’s pre-existing political views. Honest inquiry after truth is a
thing of the past. And why not? The left has, for decades, told us it did
not exist.
For that matter, a consistent conservative or consistent liberal exposed only to O’Reilly or Maddow might never know their claims had
been debunked. The evidence indicates such a conservative and liberal
would probably not encounter each other anyway. If they did, how
would they communicate? Words would simply be instruments of political will.
Log os a nd W ill
This, ultimately, is why it matters that President Trump misleads. It mattered that Hillary Clinton did too, but Trump won and now bears the
burdens and accountability of leadership. Nor is it enough to say, as his
advisor Kellyanne Conway did in his defense, that it is necessary to look
at “what’s in his heart” rather than “what’s come out of his mouth.” We
do not have direct insight into each other’s hearts. Isaac did not bless
Jacob with his heart; he used words. The mechanism we use to convey
our inner thoughts and feelings is speech. There is no alternative save
force. Consequently, preserving the meaning of words matters.
It matters if, first, Aristotle was right that logos is the means of revealing the good and the bad and the just and the unjust and, second, if
the good and the bad and the just and the unjust are matters of beauty
and enduring importance. It is especially unbecoming of conservatism,
then, to excuse Trump’s abuse of language. If Russell Kirk was right in
two of his 10 conservative principles — that “there exists an enduring
moral order” and that “conservatives are chastened by their principle of
imperfectability” — then presumably the defense of that order requires
an ongoing pursuit conducted through the medium of speech. If he was
right in a third principle — adherence to “custom, convention, and continuity” — words are also the relevant medium, for they are the means
of conveying tradition with consistent meaning.
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This is not to say language and meanings do not evolve. They do. But
even in that case, words retain meanings when they are spoken. There
is a difference between language that evolves by decentralized percolation, gradually over time, and a sudden, top-down emptying out of the
content of words altogether.
This is not to apologize, either, for liberal sanctimony. Trump is not
an aberration. It is the argot of the left as expressed, inter alia, in the elliptical phrases of Foucault that dignified with theory precisely what Trump
claims more crudely: that language is no more than will, merely power
translated into words. The relativism long emanating from the academy
leaves an institution to which we should above all be able to look for the
pursuit of beauty and truth unable to speak in objective terms for either.
If there is no objective truth, how is it possible to say Trump lied?
Foucault, of course, was ultimately wrong in another, more important sense. Words are not instruments of power. The destruction of
words is an instrument of power. Orwell understood this. “You think,
I dare say,” Winston’s friend Syme tells him of the coming edition of
the Newspeak dictionary in 1984, “that our chief job is inventing new
words. But not a bit of it! We’re destroying words — scores of them,
hundreds of them, every day.”
No serious person believes President Trump, like the rulers of
Oceania, has embarked on an insidious program to undermine the language to inhibit resistance. That too, would credit him excessively. The
academic left can justly be accused of a deliberate effort to diminish the
integrity of truth and language. The president seems, instead, to suffer
from a sort of compulsion to exaggerate and distort, from a kind of
defect of character with respect to the truth.
The point, rather, is that this compulsion, when expressed repeatedly by a president of the United States, is consequential. Presidents
can help to normalize once-aberrant behavior. They are neither clergy
nor saints, but neither are they disembodied policies. The integrity and
credibility of the office is not wholly separable from the character of
its occupant. Most problematic, the devaluing of the currency of republicanism — that is, logos — strips politics of the nobility of the good
and the bad and the just and the unjust. All that is left standing is will.
Perhaps it is not coincidence that — speaking as he does of winners and
losers, the strong and the weak — will is the president’s forte.
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